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Introduction
All over Norway we observe gasoline price cycles that last exactly one week. Every Monday around noon, almost all retail outlets throughout Norway increase their retail prices to the same level. For the majority of retail outlets prices then gradually decline over the week, and are at their lowest level during the weekend and Monday morning.
We show how the big four gasoline companies use a vertical restraint (labeled price support) to move price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters of the big four companies. The way the price support system is used to ensure intrabrand synchronization of pump prices when the price cycles are restarted, resembles findings from Australia (Wang, 2009 ). We show that since 2004 the headquarters have managed to establish an industry-wide pattern where all retail outlets raise their pump prices according to the recommended prices set by the headquarters around noon every Monday. The price support system is thus a device that ensures intrabrand price coordination on Mondays. In contrast to the findings from Australia, we find that the headquarters simultaneously (without knowing rivals' pump prices) increase their prices on Mondays. In the rest of the week, gasoline pump prices are set sequentially, and we show that the degree of vertical price control imposed by the headquarters towards the retail outlets varies from a pure Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) to a price floor.
Price cycles, where sharp price increases are followed by a gradual reduction of retail prices, are found in markets in the United States (Castanias and Johnson, 1993 , Doyle et.al. 2010 , Lewis, 2011 , Canada (Atkinson, 2009 , Eckert, 2002 , 2003 , Eckert and West, 2004 , and Noel, 2007a , 2007b and Australia (ACCC, 2007 and Wang, 2008 ), among others. In contrast to our findings, the price cycles observed in other SNF Working Paper No 07/2011 2 markets are typically longer than a week, and do not have a fixed duration like the Norwegian price cycles. Weekly price cycles have recently been observed in Australia, where Thursday is the high-price day (ACCC, 2007) . As mentioned above a price support system is also present in Australia, but to our knowledge, we do not observe an industry-wide jump in prices to the same level as described in the present paper.
The majority of these studies find empirical support for the notion that these price cycles are the outcome of competition à la Maskin and Tirole's (1988) Edgeworth cycle theory.
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In Maskin and Tirole (1988) firms successively undercut each other in a price war phase, until further undercutting becomes too costly. We then have a war of attrition phase until one firm takes the burden and raises its prices. Other firms will then immediately follow suit and increase their prices, but not to the same level as the firm that initiated the price increase. The next cycle will then begin.
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A critical assumption is that firms set prices sequentially in both the increasing phase and the decreasing phase.
When firms are in the war of attrition phase, Maskin and Tirole assume that firms play a mixed strategy game in order to decide whether they should be the first to increase the price or not. As emphasized by Wang (2009) , firms have incentives to end the war of attrition game as soon as possible, and a firm may take the role as the price leader (see also Lewis, 2011) . A main contribution of the present paper is to show how the headquarters of gasoline companies in Norway have managed to 1 Labeled Edgeworth cycles owing to Edgeworth (1925) .
2 Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007b Noel ( , 2008 show that Edgeworth cycles in equilibrium are not restricted to a symmetric duopoly with homogenous goods, as assumed by Maskin and Tirole (1988) . These extensions (which e.g. allow for size asymmetries) still predict that firms move sequentially.
3 establish an arrangement whereby they simultaneously decide to increase pump prices to a given level (the recommended price).
The empirical studies closest in spirit to the current paper are Eckert and West (2004) and Noel (2007a) , both of which use daily retail prices from the Canadian market. The main distinction between our observations and those of Eckert and West (2004) and Noel (2007a) relates to the process bywhich prices increase sharply. Wang (2008) shows how phone activity by the market leader resets Edgeworth cycles in the Australian retail gasoline cartel. More recently, Clark and Houde (2011) analyze how retailers in Quebec used phone conversations to initiate price increases after periods of repeated price reductions. Other empirical studies have considered weekly retail gasoline prices. Wang (2009) analyzes gasoline pricing before and under a law that regulates both the timing and frequency of retail price changes in Australia. Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007b) analyze weekly prices in the Canadian retail gasoline market, and find cycles consistent with Edgeworth cycle theory. Importantly, the type of fluctuations on which we focus in the present analysis cannot be discovered using weekly data.
3 Noel (2009) analyzes how asymmetric cost pass-through in gasoline prices can be partly due to Edgeworth cycles using twice-daily price data from Canada. Analogous to Wang (2009) we draw attention to how the headquarters use vertical price control arrangements to restart the price cycles.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets used, and section 3 presents details of the price cycle pattern in Norway. In Section 4, we describe how retail prices are determined. In section 5 we discuss potential alternative explanations for the pattern observed. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Data description
We collected two data sets with daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump prices: The NWB and LTS data sets are complementary in the sense that, whereas the webbased data (NWB) allows us to examine a wider set of stations over a longer timeperiod, the local data (LTS) on specific gasoline stations allows for a more precise analysis of price patterns. In the LTS data we have consecutive observations for relatively long periods that we can compare with recommended prices. The data sets are described in more detail in Appendix A.
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5 When we started to collect the LTS-prices, we were not aware of the role of the recommended prices. These prices were collected between 4 pm and 7 pm. In order to demonstrate more accurately the industry-wide raise in prices towards the recommended prices, we collected the following data set:
 Pump prices at 8 am and 2 pm for three consecutive Mondays in April 2008 for all gasoline stations in Oslo. We label this the OSLO data set.
As a complement to our analysis of the price data, we undertook the following survey:
 In 2008 and 2009 we interviewed 35 gasoline station managers in order to gain more information about the price support system and how price control shifts from the hands of the retailers to the headquarters, and how this system is used to ensure interbrand uniform pump prices on Mondays around noon.
Price cycles
Descriptive analysis
The Norwegian market is dominated by the big four gasoline companies; Statoil (the partially state owned oil company), Shell, Esso (Exxon), and Hydro-Texaco (now YX The average daily prices over all seven local gasoline stations are illustrated in Figure   1 . The price is clearly at its highest on Monday before gradually returning to its lowest level over the week. Looking only at averages might be misleading. To fully uncover the underlying dynamics in price changes across stations we have therefore tabulated all price changes for all stations and weeks for the LTS data in Table 1 . In Figure 3 we illustrate the weekly cycles for the period before and after April 2004.
After Easter, we observe the same pattern as in the LTS data, whereas up until Easter 2004, Thursday was the high-price day. The 'After April 2004' pattern shows a small 'bump' also on Thursdays. This is primarily due to the return of the old pattern during the six weeks in the fall of 2004. When we disregard these six weeks, the small Thursday 'bump' disappears, and the Monday effect is even more visible. We also know from the interviews with the station managers that prices are sometimes raised in the same way on Thursdays as on Mondays. We also observe six price increases on Thursdays, five of which follow the individual rule. has recently presented data on how demand varies over the week.
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In Figure 6 we show a facsimile from the Norwegian Competition Authority (2010). weekdays, volume is not reduced in peak-periods during weekdays. This suggests that it is not as easy for the utility drivers to change their consumption pattern during weekdays as it is for the more price sensitive ordinary customers that can indeed adapt to the changes in the weekly cycle by filling gasoline during the weekend (see discussion on price discrimination below).
Econometric analysis
In this section, we introduce some simple econometric models. We use the NWB data set. Since we have an unbalanced panel with a significant number of consecutive observations for only some stations, we choose not to impose an autoregressive process. To account for potential local market effects and heterogeneity across stations we estimate a fixed effect model where we include a full set of station
In addition, we include seven brand dummies (Brand). 8 We estimate the following model:
(1) The results are presented in Table 2 . 9 Both the tax and the wholesale variables are significant and positive for both periods.
10
The results suggest a weak negative trend, though it turns positive when we exclude the six weeks of fall in 2004.
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The brand dummies are significant in five to six out of seven cases. The lower-priced automated stations, as expected, have negative parameters, which are significant in five out of six cases across models. The explanatory power is reasonably high, even though we were unable to incorporate an autoregressive process into the model. 10 There are some differences in magnitude on these parameters across models. We have re-estimated the models, imposing the 'Prior' parameter estimates for Tax and Rotterdam price in the 'After' models, and the 'After' parameter estimates in the 'Prior' models. The results remains the same, in particular the price pattern parameters are very similar to those in Table 2. 11 All three models have been estimated removing the trend, and the results are much the same. 12 We have estimated the models also applying the generalized least squares method of Prais-Winsten, allowing an AR(1) process in the error term. The results are robust to this estimation technique. The price pattern we find using OLS is confirmed also in these models.
with all weekday dummies being significant and negative, and generally increasing in magnitude (negative) until Sunday. As we saw in Figure 3 There are, however, no systematic differences across regions regarding on which days prices are reported. To check for the importance of potential systematic effects from missing observations over time across stations we have estimated all three models in Table 2 where we include only the 10 (20) stations where we have the longest time series ('top 10' and 'top 20'). 13 A corresponding econometric analysis of the LTS data has been undertaken. This shows a clear pattern of Monday as the high-price day, mirroring the results found for the NWB dataset after April 2004 (Foros and Steen, 2008) .
14 In Table 2 we use ordinary least squares standard errors. One could argue that it would be more appropriate to use clustered standard errors. To check for robustness we have estimated the models both using clustering (station*day-of-week), and only station. The standard errors do increase somewhat, but all main conclusions are robust. The price pattern and main findings are confirmed also within these models. 
Margin development
An interesting question is whether the shift in price pattern has affected the gross margin. In Table 3 , we present summary statistics on some of the key variables. Over a period of six months within the same year, it is unlikely that the cost components covered by the gross margin should change significantly. The retail price increases from NOK 9.14 to 9.73 over these two periods (6.4%). However, whereas the tax did not change during these two hundred days, the wholesale price did, increasing from NOK 1.80 to NOK 2.16. If we account for the VAT, this amounts to most of the price increase. Still, when we look at the gross margin it has increased over these two periods by as much as NOK 0.11, or 13.5%, on average. Considering only averages does not allow us to control for changes in costs and the weekly price 
Price determination
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At the retail level the big four companies have a combination of fully vertically integrated retail outlets and vertically separated retail outlets. This dual distribution system corresponds to what is observed in several other countries, and Shepard (1993) and Slade (1998) , among others, analyze the rationales behind the choice of market structure from the upstream headquarters' perspective.
Under vertical separation retailers have exclusive long-term contracts (usually for five years or more) with one of the major oil companies, and the pump price is (formally) set by the retailer. We thus have a market structure with multiple upstreamdownstream pairs, and within an upstream-downstream pair the downstream firm uses the upstream firm's brand. We now scrutinize on the vertical restraints imposed on vertically separated retail outlets to show how the (upstream) headquarters transfer the control over pump prices from the retailers at least for part of the week. The conditional price support system described above corresponds to the one used by one firm in Australia, as described by Wang (2009) Price support schemes (also labeled temporary allowances) are used in several countries during price war periods (see Slade, 1998 , for descriptions of the schemes used in the Canadian market). The retailer then receives price support when the retail price is below a certain level. In contrast, the Norwegian arrangements appear distinctive in the way that price support is granted and withdrawn on a regular basis on given days of the week. Monday has emerged as a focal point for when the upstream firms (the big four) withdraw the price support. On Monday morning all the big four upstream firms inform their retailers through a fax that the price support scheme will be removed from around noon until five pm (the interval varies slightly between the companies).
This will de facto force the retailers to increase their prices to the recommended price (p rp ), and the retailers will in any case not reduce the price below this level before the price support system comes into effect again on Monday evening. This is illustrated in The industry-wide adoption of noon on Mondays as a focal point for when to withdraw the price support scheme has led to the outcome that all the retail outlets increase pump prices to the recommended prices. Pump prices on Mondays are thus set by the four headquarters rather than by a large number of independent retailers.
Upstream firms have managed to establish a predictable pattern, but we should accentuate the fact that this pattern could have been established by explicit communication, by implicit collusion or by one of the firms taking the lead.
Usually gasoline pump prices are assumed to be set sequentially both in the increasing phase and in the decreasing phase (see discussion by e.g. Wang, 2009 ). We have revealed several features that indicate that the big four companies increase prices simultaneously (without knowing the rivals' prices) on Mondays. As described above, the headquarters send faxes to their retailers in order to instruct them to raise pump prices around noon on Mondays. These faxes are sent from the headquarters well before the prices actually jump around noon. The faxes are typically sent (from the headquarters) during the night between Sunday and Monday, specifying which prices are to be set at noon the next day, a practice that can hardly be reconciled with sequential behavior. Thus, in reality, all the 1800 retail outlets in Norway simultaneously raise their prices to recommended prices on Mondays.
Let us now turn to the price determination process in the part of the week where the price support scheme is in force. Independent retail outlets are obligated to collect price information from a given number of rivals (classified as marker stations). The information is reported to the upstream headquarters. The interviews with station managers reveal variations with respect to retail outlets' control of the end-user prices.
First, towards a number of independent retailers (franchisees) the headquarters have imposed a pure RPM also when the price support scheme is in force. Collected price information from the marker stations is reported to the headquarters. Based on this information the pump prices are set directly by the headquarters.
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Second, towards another group of retailers the upstream headquarters give a "suggested" new price, where the price support scheme (M ps ) is provided on condition that the retailer follows the suggested price. When such contracts are in force, the upstream headquarters in reality determine the pump price reductions (RPM) throughout the week (also when the price support schemes are in force).
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Third, towards some retailers the price support scheme includes a price floor. The retailers then decide pump prices until the price floor is reached, and needs to ask the (upstream) headquarters for permission to reduce the price further. If they reduce the price below the price floor without permission, the price support scheme is withdrawn.
Finally, we have a group of retail outlets that are classified as being outside price war zones. These outlets are not part of the price support scheme at all, and they therefore charge the recommended price throughout the week. This is also confirmed by the NCA's 2010 findings.
Regardless of whether the pump price is set by the headquarters or the retailers, pump prices during the decreasing phase are set sequentially and may vary significantly from site to site.
Agency theory has been applied to answer how firms choose between different forms of ownership structure in gasoline retailing. Shepard (1993) finds empirical support in the US-market that upstream headquarters are choosing contracts with strong incentives and less direct control when retail outlets' unobservable effort is important.
25
A common problem for the upstream headquarters is that RPM is not allowed towards vertically separated outlets. However, the combination of the maximum RPM and the profit sharing arrangement (the price support system) seemingly provides a perfect substitute for setting the retail pump price directly.
26
25 Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1994) find similar results for the Norwegian gasoline market.
26 From the strategic delegation literature, we know that vertical separation may also be used to soften retail competition (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988 , Shaffer, 1991 , and Rey and Stiglitz, 1995 
Alternative explanations
In this section we discuss alternative explanations for the jump in prices on Mondays described in the previous sections.
The Edgeworth cycle theory
A critical assumption in Maskin and Tirole (1988) is that firms set prices sequentially in both the increasing phase and the decreasing phase. In the war of attrition phase,
Maskin and Tirole assume that firms play a mixed strategy game. However, firms have incentives to end the war of attrition game as soon as possible, and a firm may take the role as the price leader (Wang, 2009) . A main contribution of the present paper is to show how the headquarters in Norway have managed to establish an arrangement where they simultaneously decide to increase pump prices to a given level (the recommended price). Consequently, the firms have established an industrywide practice that ends the war of attrition phase on Mondays.
In the decreasing phase prices are set sequentially, and this part of the cycle seems to be consistent with the Maskin and Tirole approach. As described above, the price support system moves price control from the hands of the retailers to the hands of gasoline headquarters. Instead of hundreds of price setters, there are four big companies (and a few small companies) that decide pump prices. While it may be difficult to see how hundreds of independent retailers set prices according to the Edgeworth cycle theory, the Edgeworth cycle explanation becomes more appealing when four quite symmetric players decide pump prices.
others). Slade (1998) finds empirical support for this rationale using data from the Canadian retail gasoline market.
Demand fluctuations
Still maintaining low weekend prices, in April 2004 Monday changed from being the low-price day to becoming the high-price day. It is very unlikely that the weekly demand pattern changed as abruptly as the price pattern after Easter 2004 would suggest. In general, it is also unlikely that we have a large increase sudden in demand on one day of the week followed by six days with small reductions in demand (see also discussion in Noel (2007a) . This is, indeed, not the case in Norway either, which is confirmed by the volume figures from the Nowegian Competition Authority (2010);
see Figure 6 in Section 3 above.
Input price variation
In Figure 1 , we showed the average weekly pattern in retail price and taxes plus the Rotterdam spot price. We do not observe a weekly pattern in the cost components.
Analogous to Noel (2007a) , we dismiss the explanation that gasoline inventories at the retail stations influence retail prices.
Price discrimination
Intertemporal price discrimination has also been suggested as an alternative explanation for price patterns that appear as Edgeworth cycles (see discussion by Eckert and West, 2004) .
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In contrast to the Maskin and Tirole model, the firms'
27 Conlisk et al. (1984) consider a monopoly provider of durable goods that uses periodic reductions in price to discriminate between low-and high-value consumers. Sobel (1984) extends Conlisk et al. (1984) to the case of competition. In Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1984) , new consumers enter the market in each period, but consumers who do not buy, remain in the market, and the residual demand builds up until price cuts become profitable. Dutta et al. (2007) combine elements from repeated game and durable goods models where the residual demand is bounded by the 'death' of consumers. However, residual demand may be large enough to ensure temporary price cuts in equilibrium. Roughly speaking, Dutta et al. (2007) show that the existence of an equilibrium with temporary price cuts depends on the fact that firms are more patient than consumers. The result is qualitatively in line with Sobel (1984) , and may be viewed as a form of intertemporal price discrimination. Note that incentive to gradually reduce the price in price discrimination models comes from the existence of heterogeneous consumers; e.g. different degrees of patience. The practice by which price cycles restart on Mondays ensures a period with relatively high prices in the first part of the week and a period of lower prices towards the end of the week.
This may imply a price structure that largely introduces intertemporal price discrimination between consumers that differ in their willingness or ability to wait.
Even if price discrimination is not the driving force behind the cycle, price discrimination may explain why the firms coordinate, with Monday as the high price In terms of gasoline, the cost of inventorying relates to how much people drive. The
Norwegian price pattern clearly suggests a fixed seven-day cycle. People who use less than a tank of gasoline per week (the average driver in Norway) may therefore wait until the price falls, but people with a higher usage cannot. When prices increase on Mondays, retail prices are at their lowest level during the weekends, when less price sensitive business customers are not present in the market.
consumers expect a price increase in the next period, and temporary price cuts in equilibrium are thus different from equilibrium price wars.
Analogous to the findings from Canada by Eckert and West (2004) , the NCA (2010) reveals that in some regions with high concentration, we do not observe cycles. The prices are then always equal to the recommended prices (plus transportation costs).
This observation speaks against the price discrimination explanation.
Collusive behavior
It is implausible that the change in the price pattern in 2004, coinciding with an increase in markup, was a pure coincidence. The pattern may have been established by explicit communication, implicit collusion or by one of the big four oil companies behaving as a leader. From our interviews with the managers and other available information we have not been able to find a clear answer to this.
Since it was first established, the information exchange arrangement described in Section 4 has proved to be robust, and it helps players both at the upstream and downstream level to detect deviations from the rule of increasing prices to recommended prices on Mondays. The arrangement also allows retail prices to adjust for changes in demand or cost conditions without triggering deviations from the rule.
Summary and conclusions
By using daily station-specific observations of gasoline pump prices from a large An interesting issue is obviously the impact for competition policy. Communication about prices, which provides commitment value and more information to consumers about retail price differences, may very well be welfare enhancing (Motta, 2004, and Kühn, 2001 ). In the current context, however, it is difficult to see the efficiency effects of the 'public' announcement of recommended prices. The recommended prices appear to be made public primarily to increase transparency among competitors and facilitate potential horizontal coordination. As argued by Motta (2004) and Kühn (2001) , communication directed only at rivals should be banned.
As a response to the first version of the present paper (Foros and Steen, 2008 The prices were collected in the afternoon. The stations are as follows. In addition, we used recommended prices from Statoil collected from their web page.
To calculate input prices, we used Rotterdam prices 'Conventional Regular Gasoline, 28 Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association.
Rotterdam (ARA)' and translated these into NOK using the daily exchange rate between USD and NOK. The environment tax on gasoline is constructed using figures from The Norwegian Petroleum Industry Association. Summary statistics for the two datasets are tabulated below. 
